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In the model presented in Chapter 2, several flexible aspects are presented to main-
tain a sufficiently high level of the funding ratio: underfunding is penalized, and
the sponsor has to restore the funding ratio if in too many consecutive years un-
derfunding is recorded. In addition, also the level of such a payment is penalized.
Finally, we have incorporated a target level of the funding ratio at the horizon.
The flexible aspects described above are all soft constraints in our model. How-
ever, as we will see in the next section, the supervisor of Dutch pension funds also
imposes hard constraints with respect to the short-term solvency position. This is
the reason why we also consider such constraints in our ALMmodel.
The question remains how to incorporate such short-term risk constraints. In
the ALMmodel of Dert [24] decisions have to be made, such that the probability of
underfunding in the next year is sufficiently small. However, we think that not only
the probability of underfunding is important, but also the amount of a shortage.
In this chapter, these two possible ways to incorporate risk constraints which
deal with underfunding in the ALM process are discussed. They are called chance
constraints and integrated chance constraints respectively. They will not only be
compared from an algorithmic point of view, but also their interpretations are dis-
cussed. As we will see, we prefer integrated chance constraints in our ALMmodel.
Before we discuss these two types of risk constraints, we first describe (the devel-
opments of) the requirements pension funds have to comply with.
3.1 Solvency tests of supervisor (2002)
In Section 1.2.3 we have described how supervision is organized. We have also
described which actions the board of a pension fund has to take in case of financial
distress.
Currently, the financial position of Dutch pension funds are judged on the rules
written in theActuarie¨le Principes voor Pensioenfondsen (APP), which dates from 1997.
According to the supervisor PVK, these principles have too many shortcomings to
judge the solvency position of pension funds sufficiently. They are not dynamic
enough and stress the current situation too much.
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To gain more insight in a fund’s financial position, the PVK has developed new
rules, called Financieel Toetsingskader (FTK) in 2002. The central themes in the FTK
are transparency, risks and results based on market values (not only for assets, but
also for liabilities), and making methods explicit. In the FTK (such as formulated in
2002), three tests are described to judge the solvency position of a fund:
• A test which considers the solvency position of a pension fund in the long
run, the so-called continuı¨teitstoets.
• A test of the financial position based on both the assets and the liabilities, cor-
responding to risks associated with the financial position in one year, called
the solvabiliteitstoets. In this test, underfunding may occur with a prespecified
acceptable, but small, probability. Both the assets and liabilities are valued
using observed market prices.
• At the next balance date, the market value of the assets should at least be
equal to the market value of the liabilities. This test is called theminimumtoets.
In formulating these three tests for pension funds, the PVK has considered de-
velopments in other sectors. Especially the regulation in the banking industry was
an important reference point. The regulatory requirements for banks were intro-
duced by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), and started its work in 1988
(Basel Accord). Since then, it frequently updated these requirements (2000, new
accord 2002). These regulations are followed by financial institutions all over the
world. In the last accord, more emphasis is placed on the bank’s own internal
methodologies, supervisory review, and market discipline.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, funding ratios which are too low are penalized
in our multiperiod model. Moreover, a remedial contribution is required if under-
funding is recorded in too many consecutive years. In addition, we have incorpo-
rated a target level of the funding ratio at the planning horizon of our model. As a
result, the ’continuı¨teitstoets’ is taken into account in our model.
As will become clear in this chapter, we also incorporate one-year risk con-
straints in our model. However, we do not only consider the probability of un-
derfunding in one year, but also the associated amounts. Therefore, we consider
the ’solvabiliteitstoets’ in an adjusted form.
In our model, the sponsor has to restore the funding ratio as soon as this ratio is
less than θ. As a result, for θ = 1 the requirement presented in the ’minimumtoets’
would be satisfied. However, in the numerical experiments presented in Chapter
6, we have chosen to set θ = 0.90, since we think that always requiring a funding
ratio of at least 1 leads to solutions which are too expensive.
3.2 Chance constraints
In this section, we describe a first idea for representing risk constraints in ALM
models, chance constraints. Incorporating chance constraints in ALM models was
introduced by Dert [24].
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Chance constraints serve as tools for modeling risk and risk aversion in stochas-
tic programs. The board of a pension fund strives to satisfy the goal constraints
Ast ≥ αL
s
t ∀t ∈ T1, s ∈ S (3.1)
for some α ≥ 1. Incorporating constraint (3.1) in our model, might lead to exces-
sively high funding costs or to infeasibilities. Instead, the board of a pension fund
may formulate the condition that the probability of a sufficiently high funding ratio
in the next T years is sufficiently large. This requirement can be modeled as
P (Ast ≥ αL
s
t , t ∈ T1) ≥ φ,
where φ denotes the prescribed probability. Although such a long-term chance con-
straint makes sense, it cannot be incorporated into a linear program. In the pre-
vious section we have seen that the supervisor in The Netherlands also considers
the short-term financial position of pension funds. Therefore, we restrict ourselves
here to one-year chance constraints. In these chance constraints, next year’s level
of the funding ratio should be sufficiently large with a prescribed probability φt:
P (Ast ≥ αL
s
t ) ≥ φt, t ∈ T1. (3.2)
Condition (3.2) acts as a constraint on the decisions at time t, in terms of consequences
at time t+1. As a matter of fact, although the representation in (3.2) does not show
this explicitly, there are many chance constraints of this type at time t. In fact, there
is a chance constraint for every node in the scenario tree corresponding to time
t ∈ T0.
In the chance constraints (3.2), the probability distribution used is the condi-
tional distribution of next year’s random vector ωt given the observed values of the
past ω1, . . . , ωt−1. The value of the parameter φt, the minimum required reliability at
time t, is set by the decision makers. It should not be set too low, because then it
will lose its meaning of modeling a goal. On the other hand, solving models with
φt too large (e.g. approximately equal to one) may lead to expensive solutions or
to infeasibilities as was the case with goal constraint (3.1). Also note that φt may
be time dependent: in earlier years, it may be even more undesirable to have a low
funding ratio.
In formulation (3.2), P (Ast ≥ αL
s





called the risk of next year’s insolvency and is closely related to Surplus-at-Risk as de-
scribed by H.A. Klein Haneveld [51]. Decisions that are insufficiently reliable (with
respect to the next decision moment) are not accepted. This restricts the feasible
region.
It is well-known that chance constraints can be represented in a linear program-
ming framework by introducing indicator variables. We will provide the details
of this representation for (3.2). For reasons to be explained afterwards, we first
replace the variable Lst in (3.2) by the upper bound parameter L
s
t , so that the condi-
tion becomes stronger, potentially. Using the notation introduced in Section 2.3, we
now explain how inequalities (3.2) can be written in a mixed-integer programming
framework. At time t, we observe the realization of ωt, and therefore know the
actual state (t, s). Given this state, the conditional probability of each child node
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is given by (brancht)
−1, since we assume that all child nodes are equally probable.
























t+1 and 0 otherwise. Given the definition
of the binary variable ust , which was introduced in the previous chapter, the chance







t+1, t ∈ T0, s ∈ St, s







t+1 ≤ 1− φt, t ∈ T0, s ∈ St, (3.4)
where, as before,M is a sufficiently large number.
Note that we have used the upper bound on the value of the liabilities in the
chance constraints. Why not using their actual value Ls
′
t+1? The reason is that,
unlike As
′
t+1, the level of these liabilities depend on decisions to be made at time
t+ 1 rather than at time t for which (3.3) is formulated. At time t, the upper bound
L
s′
t+1 is a parameter and therefore its value is known.
If the number of child nodes is too small, the chance constraints coincide with
the goal constraint (3.1). Assume for example that φt = 0.8 and we have only two
child nodes from a certain state, and the conditional probabilities associated with
them are both 12 . In this case, the chance constraints lose their meaning of modeling
risk, since the funding ratio is required to be greater than or equal to α in all states.
To obtain sufficiently detailed information about the probability distribution of
the level of the funding ratio, one may introduce additional states, which do not
have successors. As a result, a part of the scenario tree may look like the tree in
Figure 3.1. In this figure, the additional states are described by the dots at the
end of the dashed lines. They do not have successors. Given all the child nodes
(both the ones which were already present and the new ones), sufficiently detailed
information about the probability distribution of the funding ratio is present, so
that the chance constraints become meaningful now. Although more subtlety is
introduced, we did not succeed in working with these additional states.
We have seen that the chance constraints require that we should make deci-
sions, such that only in a limited number of future states the funding ratio is less
than α. This seems to be a nice way to model risk and it has a clear interpretation,
too. And, since we already introduced the binary variables into the model to indi-
cate whether the funding ratio is sufficiently high or not, these can be used for the
chance constraints too.
Although this seems nice at first sight, we also have to deal with two less desir-
able properties in defining risk in this way. Chance constraints require that only in
a limited number of future states the funding ratio may be less than its minimum
required level α. But there are no direct restrictions on the amount of underfund-
ing. Of course, if in a consecutive years a shortage with respect to the level α exists,











Figure 3.1: A small part of scenario tree in a model with chance constraints.
the sponsor of the fund has to make a remedial contribution, which is penalized in
the objective function. But the chance constraints themselves do not impose limits
on the amount of a possible shortage.
A second disadvantage of chance constraints is that for low values of brancht it
is a rough way to model risk.
By means of the following example we will show that the induced feasible re-
gion may also be nonconvex in the continuous decision variables.
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Example 3.1
Assume that the total asset value of a pension fund at time 0 is equal to 100,
and the value of the liabilities is 90. The board of the fund requires a minimum
funding ratio of 1.1. Suppose in addition that there are three states at time 1, and all
conditional probabilities are 13 . In all these three states, we assume that the upper
bound on the value of the liabilities equals 100.
If the minimum required reliability is set to 23 , we see that the chance constraints













that is, only in one of the successors underfunding is allowed.
Assume in addition that there are only two asset classes, stocks and bonds. The
returns on these asset classes, which are denoted by rs1 and r
s
2 for stocks and bond
respectively, are presented in Table 3.1. The investments in stocks and bonds at








Table 3.1: Returns on stocks and bonds in the 3 scenarios of Example 3.1.
Given the description above, the pension fund has to make decisions, such that
the following constraints are satisfied:
X1 +X2 = 100
Mus1 ≥ 110− (1 + r
s
1)X1 − (1 + r
s






us1 ∈ {0, 1} s = 1, 2, 3
The feasible portfolios, i.e. which satisfy all constraints, are depicted in Figure
3.2 by the solid line. These feasible portfolios are specified byX1 ∈ [20, 50]∪[80, 100]
andX2 = 100−X1.
Note that if the minimum required reliability is set higher than 23 in this exam-
ple, the problem is infeasible. 










Figure 3.2: Feasible portfolios in the model with chance constraints using discrete
distributions of Example 3.1.
From this example it is clear that the feasible regions of chance constraints are
not convex. Of course, since we also have to deal with binary variables, we already
had a nonconvex mathematical program. But also in the (X1, X2)-plane, we cannot
expect to obtain convex feasible areas. Even here we might end-up in disjoint parts
of the feasible region. This makes it very difficult to construct a feasible solution
and to improve solutions. As we will see later, there is another way to model one-
year risk, in which we end up with convex sets in the (X1, X2)-plane.
3.3 Integrated Chance Constraints
In this section, we describe a second way to incorporate one-year risk constraints
into our ALM model: integrated chance constraints (ICCs). We formulate ICCs, give
an interpretation, and describe their mathematical properties.
Integrated chance constraints are, just like the chance constraints, defined for









≤ q, s′ ∈ Kst (t+ 1). (3.5)
The ICCs state that the expected next year’s shortage with respect to the level α
and the upper bound L
s′
t+1 may not exceed q. In this formulation we have chosen to
use L
s′
t+1 instead of L
s′
t+1 to emphasize the goal of the board of the fund to strive to
give full indexation in every year (so that this upper bound is the desired level), al-
though the board may deviate from this level due to unfavorable circumstances. In
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≤ ψLst , (3.6)
where we have replaced the right-hand side q by ψLst . We refer to Klein Haneveld
[53] and Klein Haneveld and Van der Vlerk [54] for mathematical details on ICCs.
Integrated chance constraints have a property which is in accordancewith what
financial decision makers mean by avoiding risk: not only the probability of un-
derfunding is important, but also the amount of the shortage. Therefore, ICCs
more closely resemble the objectives of financial risk management than chance con-
straints do.
The right-hand side of the ICCs of (3.6) is the maximum accepted expected
shortage with respect to the funding ratio α, and is specified as a fraction ψ of the
actual value of the liabilities. This is reasonable, since in this way a relativemeasure
is found which is related to the position of the pension fund under consideration.
With respect to the numerical value of ψ, we propose to relate it to the duration of
the liabilities. What we mean by this, and why we propose this, will be explained
now. The duration of the liabilities is the weighted average maturity of the stream
of benefit payments. The maturity of each benefit payment (i.e in how many years
such a payment has to be made) is weighted by the fraction of Lst accounted for by
the payment. Now, we will explain what this implies for pension funds. If the pen-
sion fund under consideration has relatively many young active participants and
relatively few retired members, the duration of the liabilities is rather high. On the
other hand, in case of funds with relatively many retired members, more weight is
assigned to the benefit payments in the near future, and as a result, the duration is
lower. For the first type of pension fund, a larger expected shortage is allowed. This
makes sense, because this fund has more time to recover from a period of financial
distress than the latter fund.
A nice mathematical property is that constraint (3.6) can be used in a linear
programming framework without the need to introduce additional binary decision
variables. This can be done by introducing additional nonnegative, continuous
decision variables Shoαst . They measure the amount of shortage with respect to the





t , t ∈ T1, s ∈ St,









t t ∈ T1, s ∈ St.
The inequalities above define convex, polyhedral feasibility sets. They are very
attractive from an algorithmic point of view. Since the constraints defining the in-
tegrated chance constraints are all linear, they can be used in a linear programming
framework, see also Klein Haneveld and Van der Vlerk [54]. We will illustrate this
by means of the following example.
Example 3.2
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In this example, we will use the same data as in Example 3.1. Assume in addi-
tion that the board of the pension fund has decided that the expected next year’s
shortage may not exceed 1.
The feasible region is now defined by the following set of linear (in)equalities:
X1 +X2 = 100
Shoαs1 ≥ 110− (1 + r
s
1)X1 − (1 + r
s







Shoαs1 ≥ 0 s = 1, 2, 3
X1 ≥ 0
X2 ≥ 0
The resulting feasible portfolios are depicted in Figure 3.3. They are defined by
X1 ∈ [20, 100] andX2 = 100−X1. We see that the feasible set is convex in this case.
Note that if the maximum expected next year’s shortage is less than 0.5, no
feasible solution exists. 
We have seen that chance constraints only consider probabilities of underfund-
ing, while integrated chance constraints take into account both probabilities and
amounts of underfunding. In addition, from an algorithmic point of view, the ICCs
have more attractive properties than chance constraints: ICCs can be incorporated
in a linear program without additional binary variables. Moreover, if the risk aver-
sion parameter is changed, the feasible region in case of ICCs changes smoothly,
while this region changes in a rough way in case of chance constraints if the num-
ber of branches is low. Because integrated chance constraints have nicer proper-
ties than chance constraints, we use ICCs as one-year risk constraints in our ALM
model.







Figure 3.3: Feasible portfolios in the model with integrated chance constraints, pre-
sented in Example 3.2.
